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Abstract
This paper recommends a broad concept of macroeconomic stability, whereby “sound macroeco-
nomic frameworks” include not only price stability and sound ﬁ  scal policies, but also a well-
functioning real economy, sustainable debt ratios and healthy public and private sector balance 
sheets. These multiple dimensions imply using multiple policy instruments. The paper elaborates 
a framework for developing countries that involves active use of counter-cyclical macroeconomic 
policies (exchange rate, monetary and ﬁ  scal), together with capital management techniques (capi-
tal account regulations and prudential rules incorporating macroeconomic dimensions). It also 
explores the role of international ﬁ  nancial institutions in facilitating developing countries’ use of 
counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies.
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José Antonio Ocampo1
The concept of macroeconomic stability has undergone considerable changes in the economic discourse 
over the past decades. During the post-war years dominated by Keynesian thinking, macroeconomic 
stability basically meant a mix of external and internal balance, which in turn implied, in the second case, 
full employment and stable economic growth, accompanied by low inﬂ  ation. Over time, ﬁ  scal balance 
and price stability moved to centre stage, supplanting the Keynesian emphasis on real economic activity. 
This policy shift led to the downplaying and even, in the most radical views, the complete suppression of 
the counter-cyclical role of macroeconomic policy. Although this shift recognized that high inﬂ  ation and 
unsustainable ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cits have costs, and that “ﬁ  ne tuning” of macroeconomic policies to smooth out 
the business cycle has limits, it also led to an underestimation of both the costs of real macroeconomic 
instability and the effectiveness of Keynesian aggregate demand management.
This shift was particularly sharp in the developing world, where capital account and domestic 
ﬁ  nancial liberalization exposed developing countries to the highly pro-cyclical ﬁ  nancial swings charac-
teristic of assets that are perceived by ﬁ  nancial markets as risky, and thus subject to sharp changes in the 
“appetite for risk”. In the words of Stiglitz (2002), such exposure replaced Keynesian automatic stabiliz-
ers with automatic destabilizers. Thus, contrary to the view that ﬁ  nancial markets would play a disciplin-
ing role, dependence on ﬁ  nancial swings actually encouraged the adoption of pro-cyclical monetary and 
ﬁ  scal policies that increased both real macroeconomic instability and the accumulation of risky balance 
sheets during periods of ﬁ  nancial euphoria which led, in several cases, to ﬁ  nancial meltdowns.
There is now overwhelming evidence that pro-cyclical ﬁ  nancial markets and pro-cyclical macro-
economic policies have not encouraged growth; they have in fact increased growth volatility in develop-
ing countries that have integrated to a larger extent in international ﬁ  nancial markets (Prasad and others, 
2003). This has generated a renewed but still incomplete interest in the role that counter-cyclical macro-
economic policies can play in smoothing out—that is, in reducing the intensity of—business cycles in the 
developing world. At the same time, since the Asian crisis, recognition has grown that liberalized capital 
accounts and ﬁ  nancial markets tend to generate excessively risky private sector balance sheets, and that 
an excessive reliance on short-term external ﬁ  nancing enhances the risks of currency crises. Preventive 
(prudential) macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial policies, which aim to avoid the accumulation of unsustainable 
public and private sector debts and balance sheets during periods of ﬁ  nancial euphoria, have thus become 
part of the standard recipe since the Asian crisis. This represents, however, only a partial return to a coun-
ter-cyclical macroeconomic framework, for no equally strong consensus has yet emerged on the role of 
expansionary policies in facilitating recovery from crises.
1  This is a revised version of a paper previously presented at the Seminar “From the Washington Consensus Towards 
a New Global Governance” at the Universal Forum for Cultures, Barcelona, 24-25 September 2004. I thank 
participants in the Forum and Stephany Grifﬁ  th-Jones, Maria Angela Parra, Lance Taylor and Camilo Tovar for 
their comments on the prior version of this paper.2  DESA Working Paper No. 1
Thus, the menu of macroeconomic policies has broadened in recent years. We have only come 
part of the way, however, to the full recognition that macroeconomic stability involves multiple dimen-
sions, including not only price stability and sound ﬁ  scal policies, but also a well-functioning real econo-
my, sustainable debt ratios, and healthy domestic ﬁ  nancial and non-ﬁ  nancial private sector balance sheets. 
A well-functioning real economy requires, in turn, smoother business cycles, moderate long-term interest 
rates and competitive exchange rates, all of which may be considered intermediate goals of the ultimate 
Keynesian objective: full employment. Such a broad view of macroeconomic stability should recognize, 
in any case, that there is no simple correlation between its various dimensions and, thus, that multiple 
objectives and signiﬁ  cant trade-offs are intrinsic to the design of “sound” macroeconomic frameworks.
This view should lead to the recognition of the role played by two sets of policy packages, whose 
relative importance will vary depending on the structural characteristics, the macroeconomic policy tradi-
tion and the institutional capacity of each country. The ﬁ  rst involves a mix of counter-cyclical ﬁ  scal and 
monetary policies with appropriate (and, as we will argue, generally intermediate) exchange-rate regimes. 
The second includes a set of capital management techniques designed to reduce the unsustainable accumu-
lation of public and private sector risks in the face of pro-cyclical access to international capital markets.
To encourage economic growth, such interventions through the business cycle should lead to 
sound ﬁ  scal systems that provide the necessary resources for the public sector to do its job, a competitive 
exchange rate and moderate long-term real interest rates. These conditions, together with deep ﬁ  nancial 
markets that provide suitably priced investment ﬁ  nance in the domestic currency with sufﬁ  ciently long 
maturities, are the best contribution that macroeconomics can make to growth.
This paper calls for a broad view of macroeconomic stability and for active counter-cyclical macro-
economic policies supported by the equally active use of capital management techniques. It is divided into 
four sections. The ﬁ  rst section identiﬁ  es some “stylized facts” about ﬁ  nancial and real macroeconomic insta-
bility in developing countries. The subsequent two sections each analyse one of the afore-mentioned policy 
packages. The last takes a brief look at the implications of this framework for international cooperation.
Some stylized facts
The characteristics and costs of capital account volatility
Trade—including terms of trade—ﬂ  uctuations continue to play a major role in the determination of busi-
ness cycles in developing countries, particularly in commodity-dependent economies. Domestic factors, 
including political and climatic variables, also continue to play a role. Nonetheless, the distinguishing 
feature of developing country business cycles since the 1970s has been the leading role played by capital 
account ﬂ  uctuations, particularly in those economies with access to international private capital markets 
(the “emerging” economies).
These new sources of vulnerability are associated with the ﬂ  ow and balance-sheet effects of 
capital-account ﬂ  uctuations on the behaviour of domestic ﬁ  nancial and non-ﬁ  nancial agents. Rather than 
the price and wage rigidities emphasized by traditional macroeconomic models, ﬁ  nancial variables—such 
as capital-account cycles, their domestic ﬁ  nancial multipliers and their reﬂ  ection in asset prices—have 
thus become the major determinant of growth volatility (Easterly and others, 2001). Furthermore, whereas 
some of the effects of ﬁ  nancial instability are transmitted through public sector accounts (as the ﬁ  rst gen-A Broad View of Macroeconomic Stability  3
eration of crisis models tended to emphasize), the dominant feature of the “new generation” of business 
cycles in developing countries is the sharp ﬂ  uctuation in private spending and balance sheets. A major 
implication of this is that “twin” external and domestic ﬁ  nancial crises have become more frequent since 
the breakdown of Bretton Woods exchange-rate arrangements in the early 1970s (IMF, 1998; Bordo and 
others, 2001).
Boom-bust capital-account cycles in developing countries are characterized by the twin phenom-
ena of volatility and contagion. The ﬁ  rst is associated with signiﬁ  cant changes in risk evaluation of what 
international market agents consider to be risky assets, which involve the alternation of periods of “appe-
tite for risk” (or, more properly, underestimation of risks) with those in which there is a “ﬂ  ight to quality” 
(risk aversion). The second implies that, due to the costs and asymmetries in information, developing 
countries (or groups of them) are pooled together in risk categories viewed by market agents as being 
strongly correlated. Beyond any objective criteria that may underlie such views, this practice turns such 
correlations into self-fulﬁ  lling prophecies. Countries are then pulled in the same direction by the herding 
behaviour of investors, generating both a contagion of optimism and a contagion of pessimism. Further-
more, market-sensitive risk management practices as well as other features of ﬁ  nancial market operations 
(such as benchmarking and evaluation of managers against competitors) tend to increase this herding 
behaviour (Persaud, 2000).
As a result of these factors, developing countries were pulled together into the ﬁ  nancial boom 
that started in the early 1990s (Calvo and others, 1993), but they have also been subject to a clustering of 
“sudden stops” in external ﬁ  nancing since the Asian crisis (Calvo and Talvi, 2004), in both cases with some 
independence from the “fundamental” macroeconomic factors. In turn, ﬁ  nancial market evaluations are 
subject to pro-cyclical patterns—as reﬂ  ected, for example, in the highly pro-cyclical pattern of credit rat-
ings (Reisen, 2003). They are also subject to the inconsistent judgement of individual economies over time, 
which may lead to some “success” stories being reclassiﬁ  ed as ﬁ  nancial pariahs (e.g., Argentina) and pa-
riahs reclassiﬁ  ed as “investment grade” (e.g., the Russian Federation). Interestingly, due to herding behav-
iour, countries viewed by markets as “success” stories are almost inevitably drawn into the boom, inducing 
sizeable private sector deﬁ  cits (Ffrench-Davis, 2001; Marfán, 2005) that may subject them to the endog-
enous unstable dynamics which have been analysed by Minsky (1982) and Taylor (1998), among others.
Volatility is reﬂ  ected in the pro-cyclical pattern of spreads (narrowing during booms, widening 
during crises), but also in variations in the availability of ﬁ  nancing (the presence or absence of credit ra-
tioning) and in maturities (reduced availability of long-term ﬁ  nancing during crises, or the use of options 
that have a similar effect). The feedback between increases in spreads (country risk premia), debt accumu-
lation and short-term macroeconomic expectations during crises can be highly destabilizing, particularly 
in the presence of high debt/export ratios (Frenkel, 2005). Different types of capital ﬂ  ows are subject to 
different volatility patterns. In particular, the higher volatility of short-term capital indicates that reliance 
on such ﬁ  nancing is highly risky (Rodrik and Velasco, 2000), whereas the smaller volatility of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) vis-à-vis all forms of ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows is considered a source of strength.
Capital-account cycles involve short-term movements, such as the very intense movements of 
spreads and the frequency of interruption (rationing) of ﬁ  nancing. These phenomena were observed dur-
ing the Asian and, particularly, the Russian crises. Perhaps more importantly, however, they also involve 
medium-term ﬂ  uctuations, as the experience of the past three decades indicates. Indeed, during these 4  DESA Working Paper No. 1
decades, the developing world has experienced two such medium-term cycles that left strong imprints in 
the growth rates of many countries: a boom of external ﬁ  nancing (mostly in the form of syndicated bank 
loans) in the 1970s, followed by a debt crisis in a large part of the developing world in the 1980s; and a 
new boom in the 1990s (then mostly portfolio ﬂ  ows), followed by a sharp reduction in net ﬂ  ows since the 
Asian crisis.
There is widespread evidence that ample private sector ﬁ  nancing encourages, and certainly re-
wards, pro-cyclical macroeconomic policies during booms. On the other hand, authorities are expected to 
behave in ways that generate “credibility” for ﬁ  nancial markets during crises, which means that they are 
judged according to their capacity to adopt pro-cyclical austerity policies. This generates, in turn, eco-
nomic and political economy pressures to also adopt pro-cyclical policies during booms. Financial and 
non-ﬁ  nancial agents resist then the restrictions that authorities may impose on their ability to spend or 
lend, whereas authorities are only too happy to have some breathing space after a period of austerity. Thus, 
contrary to the notion that ﬁ  nancial markets would have a disciplining effect, unstable external ﬁ  nancing 
has, in a strong sense, distorted the incentives that economic agents and authorities face throughout the 
business cycle, inducing pro-cyclical behaviour from both economic agents and macroeconomic policies.
The costs of ﬁ  nancial volatility in terms of economic growth are high. Volatility leads to a high 
average rate of underutilization of production capacity that reduces the productivity of capital. In turn, the 
uncertainty associated with variability in growth rates has adverse effects on capital accumulation (Loayza 
and others, 2003). More importantly, in the presence of increasing returns, strong recessions generate 
signiﬁ  cant losses of resources that may have cumulative effects (Easterly, 2001, chap. 10). In the most 
favourable case, this will be reﬂ  ected in a once-and-for-all loss in gross domestic product (GDP) (as in 
the experience of the Republic of Korea during the Asian crisis); in the most adverse case, it will lead to 
a displacement in the long-term growth trajectory (as in most Latin American countries in the 1980s, or 
Indonesia during the Asian crisis).
The underlying ﬁ  nancial and macroeconomic asymmetries
The dynamics of boom-bust cycles are deeply rooted in the operation of ﬁ  nancial markets, but also in 
some basic asymmetries of the world economy, which are largely (though not exclusively) of a centre-pe-
riphery character (Ocampo, 2003b; Ocampo and Martin, 2003). In the ﬁ  nancial area, these asymmetries 
are reﬂ  ected in three basic facts: (a) the incapacity of most countries to issue liabilities in their own cur-
rencies, a phenomenon that has become known as “original sin” (Eichengreen and others, 2003; Hausman 
and Panizza, 2003); (b) differences in the degree of domestic ﬁ  nancial and capital market development, 
which lead to an under-supply of long-term ﬁ  nancial instruments; and (c) the small size of developing 
countries’ domestic ﬁ  nancial markets vis-à-vis the magnitude of the speculative pressures they may face 
(Council on Foreign Relations, 2000). Taking the ﬁ  rst two of these phenomena together, this implies that 
domestic ﬁ  nancial markets in the developing world are signiﬁ  cantly more “incomplete” than those in the 
industrial world, and thus that some ﬁ  nancial intermediation must necessarily be conducted through inter-
national markets. As a result, developing countries are plagued by variable mixes of currency and maturity 
mismatches in the balance sheets of their economic agents. This also implies that integration into interna-
tional ﬁ  nancial markets is an integration between unequal partners (ECLAC, 2000, chap. 8).
Financial asymmetries are reﬂ  ected, in turn, in macroeconomic asymmetries, particularly in the 
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are the international currencies, have larger degrees of freedom to undertake counter-cyclical macroeco-
nomic policies and to induce a stabilizing response from markets. In contrast, as we have seen, developing 
countries have more limited degrees of freedom to do so, and face pro-cyclical pressures from ﬁ  nancial 
markets (Kamisky and others, 2004). In this sense, developing countries are both “business-cycle takers” 
and “policy takers” (Ocampo, 2002).
The risks associated with ﬁ  nancial instability can be partly corrected by domestic policy actions. 
Indeed, this paper addresses ways of dealing with such vulnerabilities. Such actions, however, are not 
costless because “self-insurance” is costly. Furthermore, some of the policy actions that emerging econo-
mies can adopt to manage risks merely shift those risks, rather than correct them. For example, larger 
short-term capital ﬂ  ows can be counterbalanced by a simultaneous accumulation of international reserves, 
but this route implies a loss equivalent to the spread between lending and borrowing interest rates on the 
accumulated reserves. Also, the risks faced by the domestic ﬁ  nancial sector can be counterbalanced by 
more strict prudential regulations of domestic ﬁ  nancial activities than international (Basel) standards, but 
this raises the cost of ﬁ  nancial intermediation and may restrict the development of new ﬁ  nancial services. 
The move to a currency board regime or dollar/euroization can reduce or eliminate currency risks, but it 
may also make economic activity more volatile, given the restrictions placed on the adoption of counter-
cyclical policies. There is, therefore, a very profound sense in which the ﬁ  nancial and macroeconomic 
asymmetries that affect developing countries are inescapable. In this context, the search for shortcuts and 
“silver bullets” does not eliminate the difﬁ  cult tradeoffs that such asymmetries generate, and it may actu-
ally increase the costs incurred in the absence of a broad framework for macroeconomic stability.
Counter-cyclical macroeconomic policy
The exchange-rate regime and the scope for monetary autonomy
The traditional instruments of trade and balance of payments management used by developing countries 
throughout most of the post-war period became severely criticized as a source of inefﬁ  ciency and rent seek-
ing; in recent years, therefore, they have been weakened or dismantled altogether. Interestingly, the counter-
cyclical role that they played in economies where the business cycles are largely of an external origin has 
been generally overlooked. Thus, protection and export subsidies were used to encourage trade restructur-
ing during periods of adverse external shocks, while trade liberalization and reduction of export subsidies 
were used to reduce the expansionary effects of export booms. Capital controls and dual exchange rates 
were also used to manage pro-cyclical swings in capital ﬂ  ows. In practice, trade and capital account liberal-
ization thus eliminated instruments that could be used to manage externally-generated business cycles.
This left the exchange rate as the major and, in many cases, the only instrument of balance of pay-
ments management. The exchange rate can play a counter-cyclical role by encouraging trade restructuring 
through the business cycle—in promoting exports and efﬁ  cient import substitution during periods of for-
eign exchange scarcity, and the opposite during periods of abundance. As the literature on the contraction-
ary effects of devaluation (expansionary effects of appreciation) indicates, however, the aggregate demand 
effects of exchange-rate ﬂ  uctuations may be pro-cyclical, at least in the short run (Díaz-Alejandro, 1988, 
chap. 1; Krugman and Taylor, 1978).
Furthermore, real exchange-rate ﬂ  uctuations are not without costs if tradable sectors face learn-
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exchange abundance (an increase in commodity prices or capital ﬂ  ows) may have long-term de-indus-
trialization effects, as indicated in the literature on the “Dutch disease” (Krugman, 1990, chap. 7; van 
Wijnbergen, 1984). Real exchange-rate instability is also costly if entry into tradable sectors has ﬁ  xed 
costs (ﬁ  xed capital investments or ﬁ  xed costs of building a clientele in foreign markets). In broader terms, 
in open developing economies, the real exchange rate is one of the crucial determinants of investment, 
growth and employment (Frenkel, 2004).
In any case, in a world of capital account volatility, trade effects are overshadowed by the wealth 
effects that exchange-rate ﬂ  uctuations have in economies with currency mismatches in their balance 
sheets (net external liabilities denominated in foreign currencies). The capital gains generated by appre-
ciation during upswings help to fuel the private spending boom, whereas the capital losses generated by 
depreciation have the opposite effect during downturns. Furthermore, such gains induce additional net 
inﬂ  ows (including net variations of ﬂ  ight capital) when there are expectations of exchange-rate apprecia-
tion, and the opposite effect if depreciation is expected, thus providing endogenous reinforcement to the 
capital-account cycle.
Counter-cyclical monetary and ﬁ  scal policies could, in principle, counteract the pro-cyclical ef-
fects that real exchange-rate ﬂ  uctuations are likely to have in developing countries. A crucial factor is the 
degree of monetary autonomy allowed by different exchange-rate regimes. In this regard, it has long been 
accepted that ﬁ  xed exchange-rate regimes eliminate monetary autonomy whereas ﬂ  exible exchange rates 
provide room for autonomous monetary policies. As we will see, this traditional view of ﬂ  exible exchange 
rates is not entirely valid. Indeed, recent evidence indicates that the degree of exchange-rate ﬂ  exibility 
may not be as crucial a determinant of the ability to undertake counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies as 
traditionally thought (Kamisky and others, 2004).
These considerations imply that, in today’s open developing economies, the exchange-rate regime 
is subject to conﬂ  icting and not easily reconcilable demands. These conﬂ  icts are exacerbated by capital ac-
count volatility, by the strong aggregate demand and supply effects of exchange rates on developing econo-
mies, and by the reduced degrees of freedom enjoyed by authorities in a world of limited policy instruments.
Although these contradictory demands can be expressed in different ways, they can usefully be 
deﬁ  ned as the tensions faced by exchange regimes between the demand for stability and the demand for 
ﬂ  exibility (Ocampo, 2002). The demand for stability comes from trade, but also from domestic price 
stability and the need to avoid the pro-cyclical wealth effects of exchange-rate ﬂ  uctuations. The demand 
for ﬂ  exibility comes from the need to have some degrees of freedom to manage trade and capital account 
shocks. Authorities will thus tend to choose the exchange-rate regime based on their preferences, but also 
on the relative beneﬁ  ts (“price”) of ﬂ  exibility vs. stability, which are determined by both the external 
environment and objective factors. Increased international instability (such as the breakdown of the dollar 
standard, a period of turmoil in world ﬁ  nance for “emerging” markets or a world recession) will increase 
the relative beneﬁ  ts of ﬂ  exibility, whereas a period of tranquillity (as in the heyday of the Bretton Woods 
system, or a period of stable world economic growth) will increase the relative advantages of stability. In 
turn, while the beneﬁ  ts of ﬂ  exibility will be higher for larger, less specialized economies, the beneﬁ  ts of 
nominal stability will be greater for smaller, more specialized economies.
Another way to characterize these conﬂ  icting demands begins, as does this paper, with the under-
standing that a broad framework for stability implies that economic authorities have, in fact, multiple objec-A Broad View of Macroeconomic Stability  7
tives: low inﬂ  ation, smoother business cycles, competitive real exchange rates, stable long-term interest 
rates and sound balance sheets. Achieving these multiple objectives requires some additional instruments, 
particularly counter-cyclical ﬁ  scal policies and prudential regulation and supervision of domestic ﬁ  nancial 
systems (see below). Even if helped by these instruments, however, monetary authorities must not disregard 
their multiple objectives. Particularly, in addition to inﬂ  ation targeting, they should not disregard the coun-
ter-cyclical role of monetary policy (output and employment targeting). Furthermore, to the extent that a 
stable, real exchange rate is a crucial determinant of growth and employment in open economies, an element 
of real exchange-rate targeting is also an essential component of adequate macroeconomic management in 
developing countries (Frenkel, 2004). As indicated at the start of this section, this is particularly important 
when, as the result of liberalization, countries have given up their traditional trade policy instruments.
The call to choose polar exchange-rate regimes does not capture the relevance of these conﬂ  icting 
demands. Rather, the defence of polar regimes is based on the argument that any attempt to manage the 
conﬂ  icting demands on exchange-rate policy is futile and should thus be abandoned.
Hard pegs certainly introduce built-in institutional arrangements that provide for ﬁ  scal and mon-
etary discipline and help to avoid currency mismatches and their pro-cyclical effects (Calvo, 2001), but this 
choice is made at the cost of eliminating the output and real exchange-rate objectives of monetary policy. 
Thus, under this type of regime, adjustment to overvaluation (if the economy gets “locked” into an overval-
ued exchange rate during the transition, or as a result of devaluations by major trade partners or of appre-
ciation of the currency to which the exchange rate is pegged) is painful, and it may lead to low structural 
rates of growth mixed with strong business cycles. Nor is this regime speculation-proof, as evidenced by 
the experiences of Argentina in 1994-95 and 1998-2001, of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 
1997 and, for that matter, of the gold standard in the periphery. More price ﬂ  exibility could help, but it may 
nonetheless generate adjustment problems that are generally disregarded today.2 In particular, during the 
gold standard era, price ﬂ  exibility tended to generate additional domestic ﬁ  nancial risks during crises, due 
to the rapid increase in real debt burdens generated by deﬂ  ation (which may be thought of as equivalent to 
very high real short-term interest rates). The gold standard also generated a strong short-term bias in bank 
lending, which was necessary to rapidly reduce nominal portfolios during periods of monetary contraction.
On the other hand, the volatility characteristic of freely ﬂ  oating exchange-rate regimes increases 
the costs of trade transactions, thus reducing the beneﬁ  ts of international specialization. As developing 
countries are largely net importers of capital goods, exchange-rate uncertainty also affects investment 
decisions. Its major beneﬁ  t is thus the degree of monetary autonomy that it provides—that is, the ability to 
determine monetary policies on the basis of domestic factors, thus generating some room for counter-cy-
clical macroeconomic policies. But this beneﬁ  t is unlikely to materialize fully, for two different reasons.
The ﬁ  rst reason relates to the links between the exchange rate and the domestic price level in open 
economies. If monetary authorities follow strict inﬂ  ation targeting rules, these effects are pro-cyclical. 
This is most visible in two widely used pro-cyclical policies: anchoring the price level to a ﬁ  xed exchange 
rate during periods of foreign exchange abundance, and counterbalancing the inﬂ  ationary effects of deval-
uation through contractionary monetary policies during periods of foreign exchange scarcity. Expressed 
in terms of the literature on open-economy inﬂ  ation targeting, strict inﬂ  ation targeting will generate more 
output volatility than ﬂ  exible inﬂ  ation targeting, which takes into account other objectives of monetary 
policy, particularly reducing the output gap (Svensson, 2000).
2 See,  however,  Easterly,  et al. (2001) for a similar view to that exposed here. 8  DESA Working Paper No. 1
The second reason why inﬂ  ation-targeting in a ﬂ  oating exchange-rate regime is unlikely to result 
in counter-cyclical macroeconomic management relates to the effects of capital mobility. The key problem 
faced by the authorities during booms is that capital surges exert expansionary aggregate demand effects 
that are enhanced by the downward pressure on interest rates and/or exchange-rate appreciation. Any 
attempt by policymakers to counteract these aggregate demand effects through contractionary monetary 
policies will be partly self-defeating, as the higher interest rates will induce additional capital inﬂ  ows, and 
thus additional appreciation pressures. During crises, the reduction of capital inﬂ  ows will have a direct ef-
fect on aggregate demand, which will be combined with a mix of devaluation and interest rate hikes. Any 
attempt to avoid the latter by using expansionary monetary policy will encourage a stronger devaluation. 
Thus, if authorities consider that the exchange-rate ﬂ  uctuations generated by boom-bust cycles are too 
strong to start with, they may be encouraged to use pro-cyclical monetary policy to smooth out those ﬂ  uc-
tuations. In other words, contrary to the traditional argument about the additional degrees of freedom for 
monetary policy provided by ﬂ  oating exchange rates, such a regime may in fact lead, in the presence of 
open capital accounts and inﬂ  ation targeting, to pro-cyclical monetary policies. The only way to guarantee 
adequate degrees of freedom for counter-cyclical monetary policies may thus be to give up free ﬂ  oating, 
free capital mobility, or both.
The frequency of regimes with limited exchange-rate ﬂ  exibility (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) 
may be seen as a reﬂ  ection of the revealed preference of authorities in the developing world for striking 
a balance between the conﬂ  icting demands they face by choosing intermediate exchange-rate regimes. 
These regimes can take several forms: (a) quasi-ﬁ  xed exchange-rate regimes with large central bank 
interventions in foreign exchange markets; (b) managed exchange rates, such as crawling pegs and bands; 
and (c) dirty ﬂ  oats.3 All these regimes can be understood to include an element of “real exchange-rate 
targeting” in the design of macroeconomic policy, and many or most of them are also mixed with differ-
ent capital account regulations. According to the arguments presented above, this type of mix may be a 
rational choice when authorities face multiple objectives. Furthermore, to the extent that smoothing out 
real exchange-rate ﬂ  uctuations has a counter-cyclical effect, “real exchange-rate targeting” can serve the 
objective of smoothing output volatility.
Thus, intermediate regimes may provide a better framework for effective “monetary autonomy” 
than ﬂ  oating exchange rates. This approach implies, of course, that monetary authorities will not have 
a single objective and that they will coordinate their actions with the ﬁ  scal authorities. Nonetheless, the 
scope for monetary autonomy is limited. First of all, that autonomy will depend on the effectiveness of 
capital account regulations as a macroeconomic policy tool, an issue we will deal with below. Secondly, 
all intermediate options are subject to speculative pressures if they do not generate credibility in markets, 
and the costs of defending the exchange rate are high in this context. This is particularly true of any pre-
announcement (of the rate of the crawl, of a band, or of a speciﬁ  c exchange-rate target), which should 
thus be avoided. Thirdly, intermediate regimes will generally require sterilized intervention in foreign 
exchange markets. Although the additional reserves accumulated during booms will provide additional 
“self-insurance” during the ensuing crises, the simultaneous accumulation of assets and liabilities in exter-
nal currency generates quasi-ﬁ  scal losses.
3  For recent defences of intermediate regimes, see ECLAC (2000, chap. 8), Williamson (2000), Ocampo (2002) and 
Ffrench-Davis and Larraín (2003). For interesting reviews of recent controversies on exchange-rate regimes, see 
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In any case, one of the advantages of intermediate regimes is that they allow for a graduated 
ﬂ  exibility, with the appropriate level of ﬂ  exibility being determined by the relative beneﬁ  ts of stability 
vs. ﬂ  exibility that we have analysed. This implies that any speciﬁ  c intermediate regime has an embed-
ded “exit option”. Also, if some degree of exchange-rate ﬂ  exibility is available before an external crisis 
hits, this would provide scope to avoid the real interest rate overshooting that characterizes the transition 
towards freer exchange rates in developing countries.4
Counter-cyclical ﬁ  scal policies
Regardless of what exchange-rate and capital-account regime a country chooses, ﬁ  scal policy can always 
provide a useful counter-cyclical device. Indeed, it is frequently argued that ﬁ  scal policy is a more power-
ful counter-cyclical instrument than monetary policy in an open economy. But this argument runs against 
two strong facts.
The ﬁ  rst is that there are objective restrictions on the capacity of ﬁ  scal policy to play a strong 
counter-cyclical role. Some of them are inherent to ﬁ  scal policy: spending inertia plays a very strong role 
in ﬁ  scal affairs, and there exist time lags between the point when a change in the course of policy becomes 
desirable and when either the government or parliament decides on the new course of action. Others are of 
a political economy character. In particular, there are objective limits to the capacity of ﬁ  scal authorities 
to convince the public that they should generate large ﬁ  scal surpluses during upswings in order to com-
pensate rising private deﬁ  cits (Marfán, 2005). The public may actually reject such a policy choice, given 
that it would generate substantial distributive effects, as the recipients of goods and services provided by 
the public sector are not the same agents that beneﬁ  t from private spending. Furthermore, to the extent that 
social spending would be affected, the distributive effects of a spending cut would be regressive.
The second fact is that the pro-cyclical swings in external and domestic ﬁ  nancing generate strong 
incentives for ﬁ  scal policies to behave in a pro-cyclical way. This is enhanced by the pro-cyclical perfor-
mance of public sector revenues in the context of high GDP volatility, which implies that spending will 
be partly ﬁ  nanced by temporary revenues during booms, and that temporary reductions in revenue will 
lead to pro-cyclical cuts in spending. Also, the explosion of the debt service as a result of the variations 
of interest and exchange rates generated by adverse external shocks implies that primary ﬁ  scal spending 
must adjust pro-cyclically to meet short-term ﬁ  scal targets during crises. The orthodox expectation that 
cuts in the ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit will then “crowd in” private spending, thereby avoiding the contractionary effects 
of ﬁ  scal adjustment, is not generally met (see, for example, in relation to IMF programs, IMF, 2003).
At the same time, other pro-cyclical patterns have become more important than in the past, partic-
ularly those associated with the granting of explicit or implicit guarantees to the private sector. A ﬁ  rst case 
in point are the explicit and implicit guarantees issued to ﬁ  nancial agents and depositors in the ﬁ  nancial 
system. These also include public sector guarantees for private sector investments in infrastructure (such 
as minimum revenue or proﬁ  t guarantees, or explicit coverage of interest or exchange-rate risks). Both 
types of guarantees have three elements in common: (a) they are not always transparent; (b) they encour-
age private spending during booms (it is during periods of euphoria that implicit public sector spending, 
in the form of an equivalent “insurance premium”, is actually incurred, indicating an underestimation of 
accrued public sector spending during these periods); and (c) disbursements (cash spending) are incurred 
during crises, increasing borrowing requirements and crowding out other public sector spending.
4  Indeed, the atypical phenomenon identiﬁ  ed by Hausmann (2000)—when rising interest rates accompany the 
adoption of a more ﬂ  exible exchange rate—is only a feature of transition periods.10  DESA Working Paper No. 1
There is indeed widespread evidence that ﬁ  scal accounts are highly pro-cyclical in the develop-
ing world (Kaminsky and others, 2004). In Latin America, for example, the evidence provided by Martner 
and Tromben (2003) indicate that out of 45 episodes of cyclical swings in 1990-2001, 12 were neutral (in 
the sense that the structural ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit remained unchanged through the improvement or deterioration of 
ﬁ  scal accounts), 25 were pro-cyclical and only 8 counter-cyclical.
The costs of pro-cyclical ﬁ  scal policies are high. Given the higher ﬂ  exibility of public sector 
investment, they are likely to be reﬂ  ected in large swings in this variable, a pattern that will tend to reduce 
its efﬁ  ciency. During upswings, abundant ﬁ  nancing may lead authorities to initiate some projects that 
have low social returns. During downswings, cuts in spending may mean that investment projects are left 
unﬁ  nished or take much longer to execute than planned, thereby raising their effective cost. In turn, ex-
tended cuts in public sector investment may have long-term effects on growth (Easterly and Servén, 2003; 
IMF, 2004a). To the extent that current spending is reduced during downswings, some valuable social 
programs may be cut, the existing structure for the provision of public and social services may become 
disjointed, and reductions in real wages may lead to the loss of valuable staff. Thus, in general, “stop-go” 
cycles signiﬁ  cantly reduce the efﬁ  ciency of public sector spending.
This means that ﬁ  scal reforms must both ﬁ  rmly establish the principle of ﬁ  scal sustainability and 
adopt targets that avoid pro-cyclical biases in ﬁ  scal policy. Fiscal policies, however, cannot be expected to 
serve by themselves as the major instrument of counter-cyclical management, compensating not only the 
pro-cyclical effects of ﬁ  nancial markets, but also those of pro-cyclical monetary and exchange-rate policies.
The major reﬂ  ection of the principle of ﬁ  scal responsibility should be the adoption of targets 
for the public sector deﬁ  cit and/or maximum debt-to-GDP ratios. The deﬁ  nition of such rules is not an 
easy task, as indicated by the recent debates over the European Growth and Stability Pact (GSP). In any 
case (and contrary even to the practice of the GSP), deﬁ  cit targets should be designed on the basis of the 
structural stance of ﬁ  scal policy. Indeed, setting ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit targets independently of the business cycle 
transforms ﬁ  scal policy into a pro-cyclical instrument, leading both to spending on the basis of transitory 
revenues during the boom and to cuts in spending during crises due to equally transitory reductions in rev-
enue. The surplus or deﬁ  cit target should then be determined on the basis of a structural stance and current 
deviations from potential GDP and other relevant variables. In this regard, an interesting experience in the 
developing world is that of Chile, which in recent years has set a structural public sector surplus equiva-
lent to 1 per cent of GDP.
Deﬁ  ning a structural stance is also a difﬁ  cult task. In general, the trend of GDP growth will not be 
independent of cyclical swings, particularly in countries experiencing substantial shocks (Heyman, 2000). 
Furthermore, in developing countries, it would be important to determine also the cyclical stance of com-
modity prices that have a strong impact on public sector ﬁ  nances, but this is not easily done when these 
price deviations result from a random walk or from temporary deviations from a long-run trend, which 
may itself be subject to change.
A ﬁ  rst major instrument of counter-cyclical policy is ﬁ  scal stabilization funds to sterilize tempo-
rary public sector revenues (Davis and others, 2003). The experience gained from the management of sta-
bilization funds for commodities that have a signiﬁ  cant ﬁ  scal impact (the National Coffee Fund of Colom-
bia, and the copper and petroleum funds in Chile, for example) must be extended to develop broader ﬁ  scal 
stabilization funds (ECLAC, 1998). The counterpart of the resources accumulated in these funds would A Broad View of Macroeconomic Stability  11
be sterilized foreign exchange reserves, which will then provide “self-insurance” against sudden stops of 
external ﬁ  nancing, as well as reduced currency appreciation.
To the extent, however, that these funds sterilize the additional revenues generated by a commod-
ity or capital boom, this would make ﬁ  scal policy at most cycle-neutral. A complementary instrument, 
of a clearly counter-cyclical character, would be to design ﬂ  exible tax rates, particularly to manage sharp 
private sector spending cycles. The best candidate is obviously a tax on the source of the spending booms. 
This is the traditional argument for taxing exports subject to temporary price surges, which has served as 
the basis for the design of commodity stabilization funds. A similar argument can be used to justify a tax 
on capital inﬂ  ows, as this is the major source of private sector spending booms today (Marfán, 2005).5 It 
is interesting to note that this argument is additional to those associated with the greater monetary autono-
my that such a tax on capital ﬂ  ows may provide. A second-best argument can also be made for temporary 
hikes of value-added tax (VAT) rates during private spending booms (Budnevich and Le Fort, 1997).
To the extent that, as argued above, cyclical swings may reduce the efﬁ  ciency of public sector 
spending and that time lags inevitably occur in the decision making process, the alternative of using dis-
cretionary changes in public spending as a counter-cyclical device is suboptimal. Indeed, a strong claim 
can be made that the growth of public sector spending should be determined on the basis of an essentially 
long-term criterion: the balanced supply of public and private goods. In any case, a well-designed social 
safety net to protect vulnerable groups during crises (preferably as part of permanent social protection 
systems) is an automatic, counter-cyclical instrument that can play a useful macroeconomic (as well as 
social) role.
These tax and spending policies must be complemented by adequate mechanisms to manage 
public sector guarantees. With respect to ﬁ  nancial sector risks, regulatory policies are the proper answer. 
In the case of public sector guarantees of private infrastructure projects, it is necessary that the “insur-
ance premium equivalent” of such guarantees be regularly estimated and budgeted, with the correspond-
ing resources transferred to special funds created to serve as a backup in the event that the corresponding 
contingencies materialize. The estimated contingent liabilities should be added to the public sector debt.6
A major problem with these guarantees is that they generate signiﬁ  cant distortions in public sec-
tor accounting. As argued earlier, they have pro-cyclical effects. If deﬁ  cit targets are in place, the guar-
antees also clearly discriminate against public sector investment, for they create a strong incentive for 
governments to promote private investment in infrastructure to circumvent the targets. Dealing with all 
these issues simultaneously can only be achieved by combining a target for the current ﬁ  scal balance of 
the general public sector administration (such as a structural “golden rule”7 or a structural primary sur-
plus) with a public sector debt target that includes all contingent liabilities. Also, to avoid discriminating 
against investment by public sector ﬁ  rms vs. private investment in infrastructure, the same criteria must be 
5  It should be emphasized that the tax collection could be done by the central bank (the equivalent tax for 
unremunerated reserve requirements on capital inﬂ  ows), and the revenues could be sterilized in the form of a 
quasi-ﬁ  scal surplus not transferred to the government.
6  The IMF (2004a) has argued that contingent liabilities should be included alongside public sector debt, but it does 
not propose similar treatment of the current account of the public sector. The treatment we propose here is more 
complete and symmetrical.
7  This rule would determine that the current account of the general administration, including costs equivalent to the 
depreciation of the public sector capital stock, should be balanced, once cyclical factors are netted out.12  DESA Working Paper No. 1
used in both cases: the ﬁ  scal risk incurred by the public sector administration in either case.8 Indeed, the 
only other option is a full accounting of guaranteed private sector investments within ﬁ  scal targets.
Capital management techniques
The case for capital-account regulations
The accumulation of macroeconomic risks during booms depends not only on the magnitude of private 
and public sector debts, but also on the maturity and currency mismatches on their balance sheets. There-
fore, capital-account regulations potentially have a dual role: as a macroeconomic policy tool which 
provides some room for counter-cyclical monetary policies that smooth out spending and avoid excessive 
debt ratios, and as a “liability policy” which encourages improvements in private sector external debt pro-
ﬁ  les. The emphasis on liability structures, rather than on national balance sheets, recognizes the fact that, 
together with liquid assets (particularly international reserves), the liability structures play the crucial role 
when countries face liquidity constraints; other assets play a secondary role in this regard.
Viewed as a macroeconomic policy tool, capital-account regulations target the direct source of 
boom-bust cycles: unstable capital ﬂ  ows. If successful, they will provide some room to “lean against the 
wind” during periods of ﬁ  nancial euphoria, through the adoption of a contractionary monetary policy 
and/or reduced appreciation pressures. If effective, they will also reduce or eliminate the quasi-ﬁ  scal costs 
of foreign-exchange reserve accumulation. During crises, they provide “breathing space” for expansion-
ary monetary policies. In both cases, capital-account regulations improve the authorities’ ability to mix a 
counter-cyclical monetary policy with a more active exchange-rate policy.
Viewed as a liability policy, capital-account regulations recognize the fact that the market rewards 
sound external debt proﬁ  les (Rodrik and Velasco, 2000). This reﬂ  ects the fact that, during times of uncer-
tainty, the market responds to gross (rather than merely net) ﬁ  nancing requirements, which means that the 
rollover of short-term liabilities is not ﬁ  nancially neutral. Under these circumstances, a maturity proﬁ  le 
that leans towards longer-term obligations will reduce domestic liquidity risks. This indicates that an 
essential component of economic policy management during booms should be instruments that improve 
the maturity structures of the external and domestic liabilities of both the private and public sectors. On 
the equity side, FDI should be preferred to portfolio ﬂ  ows, as the former has proved to be less volatile 
than the latter. Both types of equity ﬂ  ows have the additional advantage of allowing all risks associated 
with the business cycle to be shared with foreign investors, and FDI may bring other beneﬁ  ts (access to 
technology and external markets). These beneﬁ  ts should be balanced against the generally higher costs of 
equity ﬁ  nancing.
In macroeconomic terms, capital market regulations work by segmenting the domestic capital 
market from international markets. As such, it can be seen as a “second best” policy that aims to correct 
the fundamental market failures identiﬁ  ed above: the inability of most countries to issue liabilities in inter-
national markets denominated in their domestic currencies (“original sin”), and the under-supply of long-
term ﬁ  nancing in these currencies (the greater “incompleteness” of domestic capital markets). A “ﬁ  rst 
8  This rule would be simpler and much better than the stringent criteria suggested by the IMF (2004a) to determine 
whether an investment by a public sector ﬁ  rm will be excluded from the public sector accounts. The latter includes 
criteria that may be contrary to the legal principles that deﬁ  ne a public sector ﬁ  rm in some countries, and that 
have nothing to do with the ﬁ  scal risks incurred (such as total managerial independence, stock listing and rights of 
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best” solution would require at least three conditions: (a) the creation of a long-term demand for domes-
tic-currency-denominated assets abroad, a measure that may be impossible according to the “original sin” 
literature; (b) coverage of the risks incurred by domestic agents with either international reserves (a costly 
“self-insurance” device) or with debt issued in the domestic currency by multinationals (an option that has 
been available to some countries according to the same literature—see Hausman and Panizza, 2003); and 
(c) the development of deep markets for long-term debt and securities in domestic currencies. But some 
of these solutions are either unavailable or take a long time to develop. Capital account regulations thus 
recognize that, given the existing segmentation, it may be optimal to respond to this market imperfection 
by further segmenting the market through regulations, rather than designing economic policy as if such 
segmentation did not exist.
Traditional controls—which many developing countries, including major ones (such as China 
and India), continue to use in diverse ways—basically work by segmenting the domestic and foreign 
capital markets through rules that openly differentiate between residents and non-residents and, among 
the former, between corporate and non-corporate residents. This includes forbidding domestic ﬁ  rms and 
residents from borrowing in foreign currency, except for some speciﬁ  c transactions (trade ﬁ  nancing and 
long-term investment) by some agents (corporations), subject perhaps to ceilings. The rules also forbid 
foreign residents from holding assets or debt denominated in the domestic currency, except for the do-
mestic operations of foreign investors (and even in this case debts may be restricted or forbidden). Finally, 
they prohibit domestic banks from holding deposits by residents in foreign currencies or from lending in 
foreign currencies (except when intermediating the allowed external credit lines).
For countries that choose to be more fully integrated into international capital markets, the pos-
sibilities are varied and can be combined in different forms. A ﬁ  rst option is to introduce rules not unlike 
traditional quantitative (administrative) controls that temporarily segment the market between residents 
and non-residents; this was Malaysia’s choice in 1994 (in relation to inﬂ  ows) and 1998 (to outﬂ  ows). 
Another option is to introduce price-based regulations that effectively tax inﬂ  ows or outﬂ  ows. Taxing 
inﬂ  ows was the choice pioneered by Chile in 1991 and Colombia in 1993 (where it was applied more ag-
gressively), using the mechanism of an unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) on capital inﬂ  ows; in 
both cases, URRs were reduced and eventually dismantled during the Asian crisis. Taxing outﬂ  ows was 
introduced by Malaysia in February 1999 as a substitute for its 1998 regulations; the exit tax was then 
gradually reduced until it was dismantled in May 2001. The basic advantage of price-based regulations is 
their non-discretionary character.
Other rules, which can be combined with any of the previous two systems or can stand by them-
selves, include more permanent prohibitions or strong discouragement of domestic ﬁ  nancial dollar/eu-
roization, and of offshore markets and the international use of the domestic currency (strongly discour-
aged by the Singaporean authorities and part of the 1998 Malaysian controls). Also, portfolio ﬂ  ows can be 
subject to direct regulation, in terms of the amounts that can be brought into the country and the domestic 
securities in which they can invest (as in Colombia). Direct borrowing abroad or issuance of American 
Depository Receipts (ADRs) and similar instruments may be subject to prudential regulations that apply 
to the issuer. And minimum stay requirements can be established (as in Chile, where the requirement was 
lifted in May 2000).14  DESA Working Paper No. 1
A comparative evaluation of these experiences leads to four major conclusions.9 First of all, 
controls on both inﬂ  ows and outﬂ  ows can work, but it is essential to build the capacity to administer the 
regulations, while avoiding loopholes and, particularly, corruption. As the experience of Malaysia indi-
cates, however, no direct previous experience of capital account regulations is necessary for success. In 
this regard, according to IMF evaluations, simple traditional quantitative restrictions that rule out certain 
forms of indebtedness may be easier to administer than price-based controls (Ariyoshi and others, 2000) 
and may thus be preferable for countries with weaker administrative capacity. Also, in countries character-
ized by deeper domestic ﬁ  nancial development, it may be easier to circumvent controls, but some tools 
may work even under those conditions, as the experiences of Chile and Malaysia indicate. A good admin-
istration requires, however, dynamic adjustment to close loopholes and, generally, to respond to changing 
market conditions. For this reason, maintaining permanent regulatory regimes that are tightened or loos-
ened through the business cycle or in response to other market conditions may be better than alternating 
different capital account regimes.
Secondly, in terms of macroeconomic effectiveness, traditional exchange controls and capital-ac-
count regulations may be the best option if the policy objective is to reduce signiﬁ  cantly the domestic sen-
sitivity to international capital ﬂ  ows. This is reﬂ  ected, in particular, in the lower sensitivity to such ﬂ  ows 
during the Asian crisis by countries that maintained more traditional regulations vis-à-vis Latin American 
countries that used price-based regulations. Also, a comparative analysis of the price-based controls of 
Chile and Colombia vs. the quantity-based controls of Malaysia indicates that the Malaysian controls had 
stronger effects on the magnitude of capital ﬂ  ows (inﬂ  ows or outﬂ  ows, depending on the target variable) 
and, more generally, on compensating the expansionary or contractionary macroeconomic pressures gen-
erated by the capital account (Ocampo, 2003a; Ocampo and Palma, 2004). Despite the fact, however, that 
URRs may have only temporary effects on capital inﬂ  ows (if they are not dynamically reinforced in the 
face of a continuous capital surge), they are not ineffective in macroeconomic terms. In particular, there is 
strong evidence that they inﬂ  uence interest rate spreads.10 Thus, in broader terms, the usefulness of URR 
as a macroeconomic policy tool is reﬂ  ected in the capacity to affect capital ﬂ  ows, domestic interest rates, 
or both, with the particular combination subject to other macroeconomic conditions and to policy choice.
Thirdly, contrary to the heated controversies regarding the macroeconomic effectiveness of 
reserve requirements, particularly of URRs, broad agreement exists on their effectiveness in reducing 
short-term debt ﬂ  ows and thus in improving or maintaining good external debt proﬁ  les. As such, they have 
proven to be a useful preventive macroeconomic policy tool.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that capital-account regulations should be seen—and, in 
fact, have been seen by countries adopting them—, not as a substitute for, but as a complement to other 
“sound” macroeconomic policies. Moreover, they improve fundamentals. In particular, they provide ad-
ditional degrees of freedom to adopt counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies.
9  See, in this regard, the comparative evaluations of some of these experiences by Ariyoshi, et al. (2000), Epstein, et 
al. (2003 and 2004), Ocampo (2003a), Ocampo and Palma (2004), Palma (2002) and Rajaraman (2001). See also 
the evaluation of the Indian experience by Nayyar (2002) and Reddy (2001), and that of the Malaysian experience 
by Kaplan and Rodrik (2001). 
10  See De Gregorio, et al. (2000) in relation to Chile, and Villar and Rincón (2003) in relation to Colombia. This is 
also the interpretation of the Chilean experience provided by Williamson (2000, chap. 4). Indeed, according to this 
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It should probably be emphasized that, in order to guarantee the effectiveness of capital ac-
count regulations, some regulations on current-account transactions (export surrender requirements or 
the obligation to channel trade transactions through certain approved intermediaries) may be necessary. 
As already pointed out, it is also essential to avoid the internationalization of the domestic currency and 
domestic ﬁ  nancial dollar/euroization (Reddy, 2001).
Prudential regulation and supervision can complement but also partly substitute for the role 
played by capital-account regulations. Indeed, the distinction between capital controls and prudential 
regulations affecting cross-border ﬂ  ows is not so clear cut. In particular, higher liquidity (or reserve) re-
quirements for the ﬁ  nancial system’s foreign-currency liabilities can be established, and domestic lending 
to ﬁ  rms operating in non-tradable sectors can be forbidden or those ﬁ  rms can be discouraged from bor-
rowing in foreign currencies, through more stringent regulatory provisions on the ﬁ  nancial intermediaries 
involved in the transaction.
The main problem with these options is that they only indirectly affect the foreign-currency li-
abilities of non-ﬁ  nancial agents and, indeed, may encourage them to borrow directly abroad. Accordingly, 
they need to be supplemented with other regulations, including rules on the types of ﬁ  rms that can borrow 
abroad and prudential ratios with which they must comply; restrictions on the terms of corporate debts 
that can be contracted abroad (minimum maturities and maximum spreads); public disclosure of the short-
term external liabilities of ﬁ  rms; regulations requiring rating agencies to give special weight to foreign 
exchange exposure; and tax provisions applying to foreign-currency liabilities (see, on the latter, Stiglitz 
and Bhattacharya, 2000). Some of the most important regulations of this type concern external borrowing 
by ﬁ  rms operating in non-tradable sectors. A simple rule that should be considered is the strict prohibi-
tion against borrowing in a foreign currency by non-ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms with no foreign currency revenues. 
Alternatively, restrictions could be placed on the maturities (only long term) or end use (only investment) 
of such borrowing. Price-based capital-account regulations may thus be simpler to administer than an 
equivalent system based on prudential regulations and additional policies aimed at non-ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms.
Capital controls obviously have costs. First, they increase the costs of ﬁ  nancing during capital 
surges.11 This is precisely the desired effect, however, as the increase in those costs has the expected counter-
cyclical effect. A second, longer-term effect may be the impact of controls on domestic ﬁ  nancial develop-
ment. Derivatives markets will have more limited room to develop, and the operations of foreign institutional 
investors that may act as “market makers” in domestic capital markets will be restricted. The tradeoffs that 
authorities face in the short run are not simple in this regard, but authorities should clearly aim to avoid the 
adverse effects that controls can have on the development of deeper, liquid domestic capital markets.
The macroeconomic dimensions of prudential regulations
The origins of problems that erupt during ﬁ  nancial crises are associated with both excessive risk-taking dur-
ing booms, as reﬂ  ected in a rapid increase in lending, and with the inevitable mix of maturity and currency 
mismatches that characterize balance sheets in developing countries. Inadequate risk analysis by ﬁ  nancial 
agents and weak prudential regulation and supervision of domestic ﬁ  nancial systems exacerbate this prob-
lem. This issue became evident during the ﬁ  rst wave of ﬁ  nancial crises that hit Latin America in the early 
1980s (Díaz-Alejandro, 1988, chap. 17), but it was broadly ignored in later episodes of ﬁ  nancial liberaliza-
tion in the developing world. Since the Asian crisis, the principle that ﬁ  nancial liberalization should take 
11  Given asymmetries in direct access to external markets, this effect may disproportionately affect SMEs.16  DESA Working Paper No. 1
place within a suitable institutional setting has been ﬁ  rmly adopted. Indeed, it is now widely recognized that 
properly regulated and supervised ﬁ  nancial systems are structurally superior in terms of risk management.
Prudential practices have traditionally focused on microeconomic risks. In recent years, however, 
increasing attention has been placed on risks that have a clear macroeconomic origin. The basic problem 
in this regard is the inability of individual ﬁ  nancial intermediaries to internalize the collective risks as-
sumed during boom periods, giving rise to coordination problems beyond the control of any single agent. 
In terms of the terminology used in portfolio risk management, whereas microeconomic risk manage-
ment can reduce non-systematic risks (those that depend on individual characteristics of each borrower) 
through diversiﬁ  cation, they cannot reduce systematic risks (those associated with common factors that 
market agents face, such as economic policy and the business cycle).
Moreover, traditional regulatory tools, including both Basel I and Basel II standards, have a pro-
cyclical bias.12 The basic problem in this regard is the highly pro-cyclical nature of a system in which 
loan-loss provisions are tied to loan delinquency or to short-term expectations of future loan losses. 
Under this system, the precautionary signals may be ineffective in hampering excessive risk-taking during 
booms, when expectations of loan losses are low. On the other hand, the sharp increase in loan delinquen-
cy during crises reduces ﬁ  nancial institutions’ capital and, hence, their lending capacity, possibly trig-
gering a “credit squeeze”; this reinforces the downswing in economic activity and asset prices and, thus, 
the quality of the portfolios of ﬁ  nancial intermediaries.13 These problems may be particularly severe in 
developing countries, where due attention should thus be given to the links between domestic and external 
ﬁ  nancing; the links among these two factors, asset prices and economic activity; and the links between 
domestic ﬁ  nancial risks and variations in interest and exchange rates.
Given the central role that all of these processes play in the business cycles of developing coun-
tries, the crucial issue is to introduce a counter-cyclical element into prudential regulation and supervi-
sion. In this regard, the major innovation is the Spanish system of forward-looking provisions, introduced 
in December 1999. According to this system, provisions are made when loans are disbursed based on the 
expected (“latent”) losses; such “latent” risks are estimated for homogeneous categories of credit, estimat-
ed on the basis of a full business cycle (Poveda, 2000; Fernández de Lis and others, 2001). This system 
implies, in fact, that provisioning follows the criteria traditionally used by the insurance industry (where 
provisions are made when the insurance policy is issued), rather than by the banking industry (where they 
are made when loans become due).
Under this system, provisions14 build up during economic expansions and are drawn upon during 
downturns. They are accumulated in a fund, together with special provisions (traditional provisions for 
non-performing assets or for borrowers under stress) and recoveries of non-performing assets. The fund 
12  For recent analyses of these issues and policy options for managing them, see BIS (2001, chap. VII); Borio, et al. 
(2001), and Clerc, et al. (2001). In relation to Basel II, see Grifﬁ  th-Jones, et al. (2003) and United Nations (2003, 
pp. 54-57). Since credit ratings are also pro-cyclical, basing risk on such ratings, as proposed by Basel II, is also a 
pro-cyclical practice.
13  For this reason, the sudden introduction of strong regulatory standards during crises may worsen a credit squeeze. 
Thus, although authorities must adopt clearly deﬁ  ned rules to restore conﬁ  dence, the application of stronger 
standards should be gradual. In any case, to avoid moral hazard problems, authorities must never bail out the 
owners of ﬁ  nancial institutions.
14  Under this system, provisions are estimated using either the internal risk management model of the ﬁ  nancial 
institution or the standard model proposed by Banco de España. The latter establishes six categories, with annual 
provisioning ratios that range from 0 per cent to 1.5 per cent.A Broad View of Macroeconomic Stability  17
can be used to cover loan losses, thus in effect entirely substituting for special provisions if resources are 
available in adequate amounts. Although the accumulation and drawing down of the fund has a counter-
cyclical dynamic, this only reﬂ  ects the cyclical pattern of bank lending. Thus, the system is, strictly speak-
ing, “cycle-neutral”, rather than counter-cyclical, but it is certainly superior to the traditional pro-cyclical 
provisioning for loan losses or forward-looking provisioning based on shorter time horizons.
Therefore, such a system should be complemented by strictly counter-cyclical prudential provi-
sions, which can be decreed by the regulatory authority for the ﬁ  nancial system as a whole or for some 
sectors or economic agents, or by the supervisory authority for special ﬁ  nancial institutions on the basis 
of objective criteria. These criteria could include the excessive growth of credit (relative to some bench-
mark), the bias in lending to sectors characterized by systematic risks and the growth of foreign-currency 
denominated loans to non-tradable sectors.
A system of provisions such as this is certainly better than the possible use of capital adequacy 
ratios to manage the effects of business cycles. Capital adequacy requirements should focus instead on 
long-term solvency criteria, rather than on cyclical performance. Insofar as developing countries are likely 
to face more macroeconomic volatility, a case could be made for requiring higher capital/asset ratios (see 
additional arguments below), but no convincing case exists for capital adequacy requirements, as such, to 
be counter-cyclical. Focusing on provisions rather than capital requirements has an additional advantage, in 
that the quality of the capital may be difﬁ  cult to guarantee in developing countries (Rojas-Suarez, 2004).
These provisions should be supplemented by more speciﬁ  c regulations aimed at controlling cur-
rency and maturity mismatches (including those associated with derivative operations), and at avoiding 
the overvaluation of collateral generated by asset price bubbles. The strict prohibition of currency mis-
matches in the portfolios of ﬁ  nancial intermediaries is the best rule. As we have seen, authorities should 
also closely monitor the currency risk of non-ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms operating in non-tradable sectors, which may 
eventually become credit risks for banks. Regulations can be used to establish more stringent provisions 
and/or risk weighting for these operations, or a strict prohibition on lending in foreign currencies to non-
ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms without revenues in those currencies.
In addition, prudential regulation needs to ensure adequate levels of liquidity for ﬁ  nancial interme-
diaries so that they can handle the mismatch between the average maturities of assets and liabilities, which is 
inherent in the ﬁ  nancial system’s essential function of transforming maturities, and which generates risks as-
sociated with volatility in deposits and/or interest rates. This underscores the fact that liquidity and solvency 
problems are far more closely interrelated than traditionally assumed, particularly in the face of macroeco-
nomic shocks. Reserve requirements, which are strictly an instrument of monetary policy, provide liquidity 
in many countries, but their declining importance makes it necessary to ﬁ  nd new tools. Moreover, their tra-
ditional structure is not geared to the speciﬁ  c objective of ensuring ﬁ  nancial intermediaries’ liquidity in the 
face of the inherent maturity mismatches in their portfolios. The best system could be one in which liquidity 
or reserve requirements are estimated on the basis of the residual maturity of ﬁ  nancial institutions’ liabilities, 
thus generating a direct incentive for the ﬁ  nancial system to maintain an appropriate liability structure.
The valuation of assets used as collateral for loans also presents problems when these assets 
exhibit price volatility because, in many cases, prices used to value collateral may be signiﬁ  cantly higher 
than ex-post prices. Limits on loan-to-value ratios and/or rules to adjust the values of collateral for cycli-
cal price variations should be adopted.18  DESA Working Paper No. 1
It must be emphasized, in any case, that any regulatory approach has clear limits and costs that 
cannot be overlooked. Prudential regulation involves some non-price signals, and prudential supervision is 
full of information problems and is a discretionary activity susceptible to abuse. Experience also suggests 
that even well regulated systems in industrial countries are subject to periodic episodes of euphoria, when 
risks are underestimated. The recent crisis in Argentina is a speciﬁ  c case in which a system of prudential 
regulations considered to be one of the best in the developing world—and working within the framework 
of a ﬁ  nancial sector characterized by the large-scale presence of multinational banks—clearly failed to 
avert the effects of major macroeconomic shocks on the domestic ﬁ  nancial system.
Moreover, many regulatory practices aimed at correcting risky practices on the part of ﬁ  nancial 
intermediaries shift the underlying risks to non-ﬁ  nancial agents, rather than eliminate them. This may 
generate indirect credit risks. Thus, for example, lower risk ratings for short-term credit and strong liquidity 
requirements reduce direct banking risks, but they also reinforce the short-term bias in lending. Maturity 
mismatches are thus displaced to non-ﬁ  nancial agents and may result in reduced ﬁ  xed capital investment. 
Also, prudential regulations forbidding banks from holding currency mismatches in their portfolios may 
encourage non-ﬁ  nancial agents to borrow directly from abroad. The higher spreads that stricter prudential 
regulation entails generate a similar incentive. As we have seen, the risks assumed by corporations operat-
ing in non-tradable sectors will eventually be translated into the credit risk of domestic ﬁ  nancial institutions 
that are also their creditors. In all these cases, therefore, the reduced direct vulnerability of the domestic 
ﬁ  nancial sector will have, as a corollary, the maturity and currency mismatches of non-ﬁ  nancial agents.
Public sector liability management
In any developing country, the public sector faces some of the most severe maturity and currency mis-
matches. Its investments are long-term in character and, except in the case of a few public sector ﬁ  rms, it 
produces non-tradable goods and services. Beyond that, moral hazard issues are paramount. Thus, speciﬁ  c 
legal limits and regulations are required, although, as argued here, strong ﬁ  scal responsibility laws can 
help maintain healthy debt ratios and structures by establishing clear rules on public sector indebtedness, 
direct mechanisms for controlling foreign borrowing, and rules establishing minimum maturities and 
maximum spreads at which public sector entities can borrow. The Ministry of Finance or the central bank 
can play a leading role in either of these areas, establishing rules that should apply not only to the central 
administration, but also to autonomous public sector agencies and sub-national governments.
Several ﬁ  nancial crises have underscored the importance of the maturity structure of the domestic 
liabilities of the public sector. The basic reason for this is the highly liquid nature of public sector securi-
ties, which facilitates asset substitution and, thus, capital ﬂ  ight. Thus, when gross borrowing requirements 
are high, the interest rate will have to increase to make debt rollovers attractive. Higher interest rates will 
then feed into the budget deﬁ  cit, contributing to the rapid increase of debt service and the acceleration of 
indebtedness. In addition, rollovers may be viable only if risks of devaluation or future interest rate hikes 
can be transferred to the government, thus generating additional sources of destabilization. This was the 
case prior to the Mexican crisis of 1994 and the Brazilian crisis of 1999, when ﬁ  xed-interest bonds were 
swiftly replaced by variable-rate and dollar-denominated securities. On the contrary, given Colombia’s 
tradition of issuing public sector securities with a minimum one-year maturity, no substitution of a similar 
magnitude was observed in this country during its 1998-99 crisis (Ocampo, 2003a).
Although the currency mismatches that characterize the public sector would recommend bor-
rowing exclusively in the domestic currency, there are two reasons why this rule should not be strictly A Broad View of Macroeconomic Stability  19
followed. The ﬁ  rst one is macroeconomic in character: the public sector can play an essential role in 
compensating the highly pro-cyclical pattern of external private capital ﬂ  ows. This means that, during 
capital-account surges, the public sector should adopt a liability policy aimed at substituting external for 
domestic liabilities. In contrast, during phases of reduced private capital inﬂ  ows, the public sector may be 
one of the best net suppliers of foreign exchange, thanks to its preferential access to external credit, includ-
ing that from multilateral ﬁ  nancial institutions. Such borrowing may also be helpful in maintaining a better 
external debt proﬁ  le and avoiding private borrowing abroad at excessively high spreads during crises.
The second reason relates to the depth of domestic bond markets, which determines the ability to 
issue longer-term domestic debt securities. This attribute includes the existence of secondary markets and 
market makers that provide liquidity for these securities. In the absence of these pre-conditions, the govern-
ment faces a serious trade-off between maturity and currency mismatches. It may thus make sense to opt for 
a debt mix that includes an important component of external liabilities, despite the associated currency mis-
match. In the long run, the objective of the authorities should be, in any case, to deepen the domestic capi-
tal markets. Indeed, due to the lower risk levels and the greater homogeneity of the securities it issues, the 
central government has a vital function to perform in the development of longer-term primary and secondary 
markets for domestic securities, including the creation of benchmarks for private sector debt instruments.
In lieu of conclusions
A major conclusion of this paper is that a broad view of macroeconomic stability is essential to the design 
of “sound” macroeconomic frameworks. Such a framework necessarily involves multiple objectives and 
signiﬁ  cant tradeoffs. This implies that, although a broad focus on sustainability, including external, ﬁ  scal 
and ﬁ  nancial sector sustainability, is correct (IMF, 2004b), equally important emphasis should be given to 
the counter-cyclical dimensions of macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial policies.
Managing such counter-cyclical frameworks policies is no easy task. Given existing asymmetries 
in the international economic order, ﬁ  nancial markets generate strong pro-cyclical effects and strong in-
centives to follow pro-cyclical policy rules in the developing world. Moreover, globalization places objec-
tive limits on national macroeconomic policy autonomy. In this context, as we have seen, self-insurance is 
costly and may merely shift the underlying macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial risks, rather than correct them. 
For this reason, international cooperation in the macroeconomic policy area should be designed with the 
clear objective of overcoming these incentives and constraints.
This means that the ﬁ  rst role of international ﬁ  nancial institutions, from the point of view of 
developing countries, is to counteract the pro-cyclical effects of ﬁ  nancial markets. This can be achieved 
by smoothing out boom-bust cycles at their source through regulation, and by increasing the incentives 
and degrees of freedom that developing countries have to adopt counter-cyclical policies. This should be 
done through adequate surveillance and incentives to avoid the build-up of risky macroeconomic and ﬁ  -
nancial conditions during periods of ﬁ  nancial euphoria, together with sufﬁ  cient ﬁ  nancing and appropriate 
debt management and restructuring mechanisms that avoid the explosive debt dynamics that characterize 
periods of sudden stops of external ﬁ  nancing. As is well known, major issues in these areas are the weak 
signals that surveillance may give in a period of ﬁ  nancial euphoria; the absence of some essential lend-
ing facilities (such as the failed contingency credit line or an invigorated contingency ﬁ  nancing facility) 
and limits on the use of others, matters which have been the subject of recurrent debate in the IMF Board 
in recent years; and the absence of an agreed international framework for debt standstills, write-offs and 
rescheduling. A second and equally essential role of international ﬁ  nancial cooperation is to counter the 20  DESA Working Paper No. 1
concentration of lending by providing access to those countries and agents that tend to be subject to ra-
tioning in private international capital markets. This is, of course, a persistent problem for some develop-
ing countries (the poorest among them), but a cyclical one for others (the “emerging market” economies). 
Lending should therefore follow a counter-cyclical pattern, not only in the case of the IMF (a fact that is 
widely recognized), but also of multilateral development banks.15
Development banks can also help to create new ﬁ  nancial instruments with a clear counter-cyclical 
focus. Particularly, government counterpart funds can be temporarily detached from bank disbursements 
to generate these effects. Thus, governments can actually “save” counterpart funds in multilateral banks 
during booms for disbursement, together with bank ﬁ  nancing, during crises. This would be a particu-
larly effective instrument for the design of social safety net ﬁ  nancing. Also, greater use could be made 
of contingency repayment clauses, according to which loan amortization would be accelerated or slowed 
down on the basis of some indicators of GDP growth, terms of trade or the availability of private external 
ﬁ  nancing. Development banks could also play a role as “market makers” for new private sector lending 
instruments that reduce developing country risks, such as GDP-linked and commodity-linked bonds.
This leads to two interesting implications of the analysis of the asymmetries in ﬁ  nancial markets that 
underlie the pro-cyclical risks that developing countries face. The ﬁ  rst is related to the “original sin”. Al-
though it is possible to think of private funds that, by spreading risk among a large number of currencies, can 
lend in the currencies of the developing countries (Dodd and Spiegel, 2004), such funds have not developed 
in a signiﬁ  cant way. Thus, their promotion by multilateral development banks and direct lending by them in 
the currencies of developing countries seem to offer a partial road to “redemption”. If multilateral develop-
ment banks want to cover the risks of such currency exposure, they can become important players in the 
development of long-term security markets in developing countries’ currencies; some have already started to 
play this role. The second implication is closely related. The analysis presented in this paper indicates that 
there is no substitute for long-term lending in the domestic currencies of developing countries. The develop-
ment of deep domestic ﬁ  nancial markets in the currencies of developing countries should thus be strongly 
supported by the international ﬁ  nancial institutions. An essential corollary of this statement is that reversing 
(and, obviously, avoiding new cases of) dollar/euroization should be an element of that support.
The macroeconomic toolkit of developing countries must be preserved and even enhanced. This 
means that developing countries should maintain the autonomy to impose capital-account regulations, and 
thus, the freedom to re-impose controls if they deem them useful. It also means that the tools for ﬁ  nancial 
sector management should be improved. Since the Asian crisis, this has been, of course, a centrepiece 
of the IMF/World Bank’s Financial Sector Assessment Program, as well as of their technical assistance 
activities. Nonetheless, this paper shows that much more emphasis should be given to forward-looking 
provisioning and other counter-cyclical tools of prudential regulation, which have not received adequate 
attention. Indeed, experience and analysis (including recent debates on Basel II) indicate that traditional 
regulatory instruments may increase, rather than reduce pro-cyclicality.
Finally, this paper also suggests that, given the multiple objectives and tradeoffs faced by mac-
roeconomic authorities, solutions are likely to differ according to the conditions that characterize each 
country. This means not only that “one size ﬁ  ts all” solutions are entirely inadequate, but also, and very 
importantly, that the principle of “ownership” by developing countries of their macroeconomic policies 
should be strictly respected.
15  For an analysis of some of these issues, see Grifﬁ  th-Jones and Ocampo (2003).A Broad View of Macroeconomic Stability  21
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